“THROUGHOUT history, poverty is the normal condition of man,” wrote Robert Heinlein, a science-fiction writer. Until the 18th century, global GDP per person was stuck between $725 and $1,100, around the same income level as the World Bank’s current poverty line of $1.90 a day. But global income levels per person have since accelerated, from around $1,100 in 1800 to $3,600 in 1950, and over $10,000 today.
et_text">”纵观历史，贫穷才是人类常态，“科幻小说家罗伯特·海因莱因（ Robert Heinlein）这样写道。在18世纪以前，全球人均GDP在725美元至1100美元间徘徊，收入相当于现在世界银行1.9美元/天的贫困线水平。不过，自那以后，全球人均收入水平持续加速上升，在1800年为1100美元左右，1950年为3600美元，而如今超过了10000美元。
Economists have long tried to explain this sudden surge in output. Most theories have focused on the factors driving long-term economic growth such as the quantity and productivity of labour and capital. But a new paper* takes a different tack: faster growth is not due to bigger booms, but to less shrinking in recessions. Stephen Broadberry of Oxford University and John Wallis of the University of Maryland have taken data for 18 countries in Europe and the New World, some from as far back as the 13th century. To their surprise, they found that growth during years of economic expansion has fallen in the recent era—from 3.88% between 1820 and 1870 to 3.06% since 1950—even though average growth across all years in those two periods increased from 1.4% to 2.55%.
经济学家很早就试图解释这种产出激增情况。大多数理论关注的焦点都是促进经济长期增长的因素，比如劳动力和资本的数量和生产率。然而，最近有一份新研究文章采取了不同的角度：增长率攀升并非由经济繁荣产生，相反是由衰退期的缩短导致。牛津大学的斯蒂芬·伯德白瑞（Stephen Broadberry）和马里兰大学帕克分校的约翰·沃利斯（ John Wallis ）收集了欧洲和美洲18个国家数据，其中一些数据甚至远自13世纪。令他们惊讶的是，经济扩张时期的增长率在近代有所下降——从1820年至1870年间的3.88%下降到1950年以来的3.06%，不过，这两个时期经济的平均增长率从1.4%上升到2.55%。
Instead, shorter and shallower slumps led to rising long-term growth. Output fell in a third of years between 1820 and 1870 but in only 12% of those since 1950. The rate of decline per recession year has fallen too, from 3% to 1.2%.
相反，更短更平缓的萧条期会提高长期增长率。1820年至1870年间产出下降了1/3，而在1950年仅下降了12%。每个·经济衰退年的下降率也从3%跌到了1.2%。
So why have these “growth reversals” decreased in length and depth? In another paper** Messrs Broadberry and Wallis find that conventional explanations—such as demographic change or a sectoral shift from volatile agriculture to the more stable services sector—do not fully explain the shift.
那么，到底什么原因导致这些“增长反转”在时间和力度上都有所减少呢？伯德白瑞和沃利斯的另一篇论文发现，传统的解释——例如人口变化、从不稳定的农业转到更稳定的服务业等转行原因，这些都不能充分解释这种变化。
More important is the rise of the rule of law, enabling disputes to be settled by impartial courts. Before the modern era, elites would fight between themselves for the spoils of growth and send the economy back to square one through wars, corruption and the like. Respect for courts to resolve disputes prevents this from happening. With populist politicians challenging the authority of judges once again across the world, that is food for thought.
更深层的原因在于法制的逐渐健全，争端纠纷得以公正解决。在现代史以前，为夺取经济增长的硕果，社会精英们争先恐后你争我抢，引发战争、腐败等一系列问题，最终导致经济的良好势头倒退。而有了法制后，公正的法庭帮人们解决纠纷，人们因此也敬重法庭，就很好地避免了上述情况的发生。当全世界民粹主义政客一再挑战法官的权威时，这不得不是一个值得深思的问题。增长史即衰退史
更深层的原因在于法制的逐渐健全，争端纠纷得以公正解决。在现代史以前，为夺取经济增长的硕果，社会精英们争先恐后你争我抢，引发战争、腐败等一系列问题，最终导致经济的良好势头倒退。而有了法制后，公正的法庭帮人们解决纠纷，人们因此也敬重法庭，就很好地避免了上述情况的发生。当全世界民粹主义政客一再挑战法官的权威时，这不得不是一个值得深思的问题。
编译：张玺元
编辑：翻吧君
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